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#7

7 October 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR CHIEF, ESTIMATES STAFF

SUBJECT: Post-Mortem of NIE Production for First Six Months  
of 1954

1. There is attached a draft of consolidated findings on intelligence gaps noted in NIE production for the period 1 January - 30 June 1954. This draft consists largely of the contributions received in response to my memorandum of 8 September to the several section chiefs with only minor editorial changes.

2. It is proposed that this draft be considered in detail by the General Group at the earliest possible date with a view to submitting a revised version to the Board as soon as possible.


3. The target date for IAC consideration is 26 October. In order to meet this, the following schedule is recommended:

Completion of General Group Review:	11 October
Completion of Board Review and dispatch to IAC representatives:	14 October
Meeting of IAC representatives:	20 October



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


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Enclosure A

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

7 October 1954

SUBJECT: Post Mortem of NIE Production for the Period 1 January  
to 30 June 1954

The following is a review of intelligence deficiencies revealed during the preparation of National Intelligence Estimates during the first six months of 1954. The estimates upon which these consolidated findings are based are listed in Tab A.

1. General

In most cases substantial intelligence information was available for the NIE's produced during the period under consideration. In many cases, however, there continued to be a serious need both for more reliable intelligence and for more timely receipt and evaluation of this intelligence in Washington. In particular, there is a continuing need for better intelligence [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] Since,  
generally, information is more easily obtainable on the Satellites  
(particularly on East Germany and East Berlin) than on the USSR


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and since intelligence on the Satellites is of considerable help in analyzing developments in the USSR, an expanded effort should be made to exploit all available channels for obtaining economic, political, scientific, and military information on the Satellites.

2. Soviet Bloc

lwr Gaps in intelligence on the Soviet Bloc continue to be those inherent in the restrictive policies of the Communist states. However, the methods employed by US intelligence for exploiting the limited range of data available are probable capable of further development. Estimative work in the period under review indicated a need for greater collection efforts or more effective and more generally acceptable analytical methods in the following fields:



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7. Miscellaneous Estimates

*see p 87*

The NIE's produced during the period in the 100 (Miscellaneous) series were rather specialized estimates dealing primarily with questions involving speculation and judgment on which little "evidence" was available. However, production of NIE 100-54 "Probable Effects of Increasing Nuclear Capabilities Upon the Policies of US Allies," on a subject generally agreed to be of continuing and increasing importance, indicated the necessity for systematic collection of all possible evidence on the attitudes and fears of foreign peoples and governments with respect to the threat of nuclear warfare in an age of "nuclear plenty." NIE 100-3-54 "Consequences of a Relaxation of Non-Communist Controls on Trade with the Soviet Bloc" indicated, as have other East-West trade estimates, the need for better evidence on the "qualitative" (as opposed to quantitative) importance of imports from the West to Soviet military strength.

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